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Was there a transition at all in Hungary? Did the system changed at all in 1990? The 
answer of the author is yes. Not in the sense that from the society’s top became bottom- as 
during the transformation after 1945- but in the sen  that private property became again to 
be the basic feature of the economic system. We can follow the evolution of the economy in 
the mirror of the financial accounts. The players of the market, households, state and 
financial and non financial enterprises have changed their financial account positions 
during the period 1990-2006 markedly. The study based on HNB data follows carefully the 
changes in the asset and liability structures of households, state and enterprises and the 
financing capacity of each sector. The state’s asset position has diminished, the households’ 
has grown. But the great winner is the foreign owner’s sector. It has an influence on the per 
capita GDP and GNI creating a marked difference between them. It is very important to 
have internal financing capacity because state budget has a deficit since decades. We don’t 
have enough in the household sector therefore the country needs external financing. The 
study examines the roots of the international indebtedness of the country, the role of the 
economic policy and the banking sector’s strategy (selling foreign-financed mortgage loans 
to the households). Today the state is in a much worse situation than before transition: State 
debt (and foreign debt of the country) is even higher t an in 1990 and state’s ownership 
(covering the national debt) is now on a minimum leve . 
 
Keywords: asset and liability structure of firms, state and households, financing 
capacity, economic policy, foreign financing, international indebtedness  
 
1. Introduction 
 “Did political transformation took place in Hungary at all?”- sounds the passionate 
question one often hears everyday talks. . 
If we look at the changes of the ownership structure in the country we may 
say that  very basic transformation happened., actually twice. The first after the II. 
World War, the second after 1990. 
                                                   
 1 Dr. Katalin Botos, University of Szeged Hungary, Faculty of Economics and 
Business Administration (Szeged) 
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 As a result of nationalisation  the private ownership had been abolished by 
the communist forces in 1949, but  regained its previous economic function by  the 
privatisation after 1990. Legal experts claim that amendments to the Hungarian 
constitution in 1989 solidified the function and significance of private property to 
the highest degree.  More, than in any country.  
The newly emerged socio-economic system in Hungary could be presented in 
several ways. I chose to describe these changes on the basis of financial accounts 
data. ( I  rely on a recent publication of the Hungarian National  Bank: Financial 
Accounts of Hungary. Data, analysis, methodology. National Bank of Hungary. 
2008.) The sources of statistical figures in this article  are referred to by page 
numbers of the  quoted issue. 
The present study  has historical perspective and does not aim to analyse the 
effects of the financial-economic crisis of  2008 but the  long term trends since 1990.  
 
2. The citizen as proprietor 
 
The economic model of the “existing socialism” after 1956  households  were able 
to save some money. Their savings were generally disposed at mutual saving 
associations or branches of the National Savings Bank. People had holiday houses 
around the cities. The housing , too, became more and more financed  by  private 
credits from the Savings Bank (OTP).  
 In the years preceding the fall of communism, when the IMF surveyed 
public expenditure and did not allow money creation f r  financing the  budget 
deficits, money was raised by issuing so called “dwelling fund bonds”. Indebtedness  
was growing and so did  subsidies from the state budget for housing. As a 
consequence of the political transformation in 1990, the composition of household 
monetary assets has changed quite a lot 
In order to cut budgetary expenditures the new governm nt of 1990  offered 
to abolish the other half of credits if debtors paid back their credits before the 
deadline. A number of advance repayments occurred, a lot of people, who could 
afford, took. Massive repayments happened. The savings of the population 
diminished .Later it started growing again. Between 1993 and 1998  financing 
capacity of the households stabilised around 10 % of the GDP but again gradually 
decreased in the late 90ies. In 2003 it amounted only t  half a percent. (p. 75) The 
reduction was partly the result of a housing boom due to increased state 
subsidisation of housing. Private investments in housing inevitably used up 
household savings and as a result these savings could n  longer cover budget 
deficits. Without household savings there is a heavy pressure for external financing 
of budget deficits, which became a cardinal problem by now in Hungary. 
 Originally most of the savings was in form of bank deposits or cash. By the 
beginning of the 1990’s the rate of cash or deposits w hin household’s monetary 
assets decreased by half. Stock ratios and business shares added up to 25%, non- 
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stock based securities and insurance reached only 7 %. By 2007 only 36% of 
household monetary assets were found in cash and bak deposits, business share 
ratios stayed at 25-26% (p. 46). Business share assts were about fourfold higher 
than stock share assets. These assets arose in the early years of political 
transformation and were due mainly to privatisation. On the other hand a great 
proportion of citizens were forced to launch their own enterprises in order to escape 
from collapsing workplaces. So they became owners of business shares. Although 
little profit could be expected from these enterprises they offered self-employment at 
least. 
Following a wave of privatisation in 1995, investment in stock exchange 
shares increased to 5% but fell back to 1,5 % afterthe Russian crisis. In the portfolio 
composition of the households we find investment coupons, public securities and 
mortgage bonds, too. The most spectacular growth can be seen in insurance and 
pension insurance savings. The rate of pension insura ce savings rose from 4% to 
18%. It must be admitted though that the above transitio  did not begin 
spontaneously. It involved a certain legal compulsion since entrant employees were 
obliged to enter pension insurance funds in 1998. 
 As a consequence of amendments to taxation laws in 2006, investment yields 
became exempt from the 20% interest rate tax. Additionally, the taxation of the gain 
on the exchange was abolished. This measure drove remarkable amounts into unit 
trusts. Nevertheless, significant capital market boom should not be expected from 
that, since unit trusts put the money in bank deposits. This means that people keep 
their money in banks indirectly rather than directly. 
Financing capacity of the private sector is greatly influenced by its liabilities. 
Let us take a look at the credit portfolio of the population. Prior to the fall of 
communism the population was given significant credits connected to  housing. In 
addition to housing loans, collateral loans, car puchase loans, free credits on 
mortgage and student loans were introduced later on. According to data from 1990 
the ratio of personal credits to the GDP had scarcely exceeded 10%, whereas this 
ratio trebled by 2007 reaching 29% (p. 47). A sudden increase in currency credits 
can be seen after 2002. By 2007 and 2008 60% of the to al personal credit portfolio 
was credit in foreign exchange- mainly in Swiss francs. Interest rates of those 
currency credits were lower; therefore they were more easily financed, unless 
exchange rates tottered. In the case of devaluation of the forint  currency credits 
become very expensive for Hungarians 
Our credit portfolio is still behind the average of the European Union, it 
amounts to 29% of the GDP (in 2007), while in the European Union this figure is 
65% (p. 48). Even in two decades we did not manage to catch up with European 
countries whose citizens were more successful in achieving middle-class status. No 
wonder, since Hungarian salaries are one-fifth of the average European salaries.  
To sum up financial situation of the households: Notions have different 
meanings in Hungary: shares in investment mean (indirect) bank deposits rather than 
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real investments in securities, and business shares are rather for self-employment 
than for real competitive ventures, so how could we possibly reach a strong, wealthy 
middle class? If GDP per capita is one half of the European average but salaries 
reach only one-fifth of the European level, relative numbers will hardly resemble 
that of the European Union. In other words, Hungary has only quasi middle-class 
with quasi property structure. Not to mention the dispersion of incomes, the analysis 
of which, however, is not within the scope of  this study based on financial accounts. 
 
3.  The state as (the) proprietor (of monetary assets) 
 
 The question of state property is of primary importance when one intends to assess 
the economic processes of the past twenty years. As real balance sheets were not 
available at the time of transformation and are notat our disposal even to this day, I 
rely in this respect on the information available in the publications of the National 
Bank of Hungary. From the publication of the HNB the financial ratios can be used 
for the evolution of the gross and net capital of the state. The majority of 
corporations were public corporations before the fall of communism. The value of 
public finance assets, that is the value of gross capital, was one and a half times as 
great as the contemporary GDP. By 2007 this value decreased to 20 percent of the 
GDP. What concerns liabilities: At the end of 1989 the nominal value of the public 
debt of Hungary mounted to 1264 billion forints which equalled to 73% of the GDP. 
A substantial portion of public debt derived from foreign currency credits, yet 
the state paid these debts to the National Bank of Hungary in Hungarian forints until 
1997 when the so called “ debt exchange schemes” were introduced. 
 Preceding the democratic transformation the Nationl Bank of Hungary was 
considered by foreign creditors as the debtor. Naturally, it was seen as souverain 
debt. A number of analyses in the field of Hungarian history of recent past (Ignác 
Romsics, András Vígvári, János Honvári, Csaba Nagy,  Katalin Botos) pointed out 
that facilities for the repayment of currency credits were not available. These credits 
did not result in exportable national production which would have yielded 
convertible foreign exchange. After 1979 public foreign debt increased remarkably 
because of a dramatic increase in international interes  rates and the devaluation of 
the dollar. To make things worse the Hungarian forint was revaluated, although the 
deterioration of the balance of payments would have demanded the opposite. The 
reason for such a measure was to avoid inflation yet, suppressed inflation caused an 
even greater deficit in the balance of payments. 
In 1982 Hungary had joined the IMF The foreign exchange policy of the 
1970’s, based on voluntarism could not be continued. As the balance of payments 
deteriorated, the forint was devaluated. This process continued for after the fall of 
communism, though the forint in the first half of the  decade was still over -valuated. 
Under the era of György Surányi, President of the NBH  a sliding devaluation of the 
forint was introduced. 
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The index for debt and GDP ratio rose above 90% by 1994, the end of the first 
democratic governmental period, since gross domestic product had decreased but 
debts had to be met at the same time. The balance of foreign trade closed with a 
deficit in the first two years of the second democrati  government (1994-98), which 
meant that the deterioration of the balance of payments was due to the debt of the 
public sector. The public debt and GDP ratio was gradually decreasing from 1996 
until 2001. Several factors, such as budget constrai , the introduction of the 
Bokros-package, and an increase in GDP during the second half of the 1990’s – 
especially in the third governmental period – played a role in the decrease of the 
above ratio. Public debts were  partly refinanced, partly  repaid through selling 
national assets. 
Unfortunately, budget deficit was continuously produced; by 2002 the public 
debt/GDP ratio stopped decreasing, and at the end of 2007 public debt amounted to 
67% of the GDP. (Even this proportion has been substantially exceeded by 2009 
November). 
 We have seen that household – sector was not able to finance budget deficit, 
which means a straight way to external indebtedness. The  over-valuated forint  
contributed to it, too. 
Taking into consideration the fact that current balance of payments was 
continuously showing a deficit one inevitably ponders over the phenomena of 
continues revaluation of the forint. Two processes took place that both influenced 
exchange rates. On the one hand an intense inflow of foreign currency began as a 
result of privatisation; massive privatisation process could be observed during the 
second governmental era (1994-1998). On the other hand a special foreign exchange 
policy introduced band based fixing of exchange rats. This policy opened the way 
to speculative attacks which, making use of higher interest rate levels, pushed 
exchange rates upwards. We might arrive at a strange conclusion from the above: 
prior to the fall of communism it was the economic policy based on voluntarism 
which revaluated foreign currency, after the fall of communism currency was 
revaluated by the market, although real economic situation would not demand for 
that just the contrary. Does it seem that we get the same results no matter what 
political system we have? 
 
In the first years of the democratic transformation monetary assets of the 
Hungarian state amounted to 250% of its liabilities, it decreased to 30% by 2007. 
This fact clearly reveals that our present economic position is much more 
unfavourable than it used to be at the fall of communism since the property 
coverage of our public debt decreased in the highest degree.  
 




This fact is rather shocking No one reckoned with the fact that the majority of the 
Parliament would not dare and would not even want to protest against governmental 
proposals creating deficit 15-20 years after the transformation.. The concern of MP-s 
was that whichever governmental party secured a place for them in the Parliament 
that party should stay in power. This dependence  ori nted them to accept the yearly 
budgets with huge deficits.  
Debts had to be paid, so selling national assets becam  the a way of  the 
financing the repayment of the country’s debts. By selling state property for cash the 
ownership portfolio of the state was exchanged for funds; the most of which was 
used for debt reimbursement and a smaller portion covered current budget deficits. If 
a portion of those funds had been used for  creating economic development funds, a 
faster growth of the GDP might have been facilitated, ven though net public debt 
wouldn’t  have diminished. Debt service in that case would have remained a 
considerable item of  the expenditure- side of the state budget. But if there is 
considerable economic growth, the relative value of debt might  have even 
decreased! It is true, the operation of economic development funds requires civil 
servants of impeccable character. It must be admitted that temptation was (and still 
is) rather great for those in power to use governmental means for political purposes, 
although this is a rather sad reason for rejecting a rational alternative of economic 
policy. 
Budget deficit and public debt are significant markers of economic policy. 
Low budget deficit (3 %to GDP) and lower than 60% public debt to GDP are 
preconditions for joining the euro zone, as well as diminishing the rate of inflation.2 
If we take a look at financial data of member states from 2007 (based on a 
press release of the European Union, October 2008) it appears that most member 
states (15 members) closed the financial year of 2007 with a deficit. Only Greece (3, 
5%) and Hungary (5%) closed with a deficit greater than 3%. The above data again 
represent the unique failure of recent Hungarian economic policy. If we take a close 
look at the dynamics of the  Hungarian deficit index, we see that it slummed in 2002 
and stayed at a low level, 8-9% of the GDP in 2006. 
 Let us not console ourselves with the fact that the leading economy of the 
European Union, that is Germany, also struggles with budget deficit — the 
shouldering of the German Democratic Republic by the German Federal Republic 
meant a serious burden on the German budget. Let us compare ourselves to Finland 
                                                   
2 It is worth mentioning that the Maastricht concept of debt differs from the one used in 
financial accounting, and Hungarian authorities are to create a special notion for it deducted from the 
financial account data.  The concept of debt accepted in Maastricht does not include portions of 
property, only cash, deposits, securities (without derivatives), and credits. It is a gross concept; claims 
are not deducted from debts. Particular debt items are calculated at face value rather than at marketable 
value. 
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who realised 5, 3%budget surplus, and we must wait the coming 20th anniversary of 
the democratic transformation of Hungary with discontent. 
  
5.  Finances of the corporate sector 
 
To use a precise technical term in international sttistics,  we look at the 
financial accounts of non-financial corporations.3 
It is a technicality of financial corporations that their assets and 
commitments change in the same rate, thus the amount of their net monetary assets, 
their balance is almost zero. Net monetary assets of non-financial corporations are, 
however, usually negative, since these corporations do not invest their financial 
resources into assets. (Exceptions to this are those special purpose enterprises 
whose function is to intermediate money between their foreign partners instead of 
financing production. For this reason they are not i cluded in corporate account 
statistics.)  
Finance requirements of corporations reached their peak during the second 
half of the 1990’s, due to a boom of investments. The year of 2002 was a confine – 
enterprises became savers. Most obviously, this is an unfavourable phenomenon 
since it indicates that in the economy has less realisable income than in the financial 
sector, that is it is better to save income then rei vest… Where does the financial 
sector transfer  the savings of the enterprises? The market  shows that, because of 
the high yields on state securities, financial interm diaries concentrated on financing 
the state. This means that the corporate sector provided credit for the state 
occasionally...For instance in 2002, when the population’s financing capacity 
decreased almost to zero, corporations became net financier. The corporate sector 
became net borrower again in the early years of the 2000. 
In the resource structure of the corporate sector owners’ shares and credits 
dominate: the owners’ shares constitute about fiftypercent. (The EU average is 
55%, that is, somewhat higher.) Credits reach one-third of resources. (This rate is 
29% in the European Union). Interestingly, credit ratio is much lower in Poland or 
Slovakia: it is around 20%. Commercial credits are more significant in these 
countries. Foreign currency debts of the corporate sector amount to more than 40% 
of the GDP (p. 61). Non-stock based securities are not common in former socialist 
countries such as Hungary, and they are rarely seenin the European Union either. 
Large-scale presence of such securities can be detected only in the USA, where 
credit ratio is very low, only 9% (p. 62). 
                                                   
3 Financial corporations are too, enterprises as all the others, even if they operate with 
specifically greater external financial resources. For exactly this reason they form a different category. 




Corporate resources are to provide for operation costs and the corporation’s 
assets. The importance of monetary assets out of all assets is ascending, which is due 
to ownership and credit relations of corporations. Out of all assets cash, deposits, 
credits and ownership claims have a significant ratio. The greatest proportion is 
formed by other active debts, which amount to one third and include outstanding 
liabilities. Regrettably enough, the enforcement of lending through delayed 
settlements of outstanding liabilities has become fashionable recently. This process 
is not among the positive parameters of market relaions; a process which we cannot 
be proud of in relation to democratic transition in Hungary. 
As regards the proprietary structure of the corporate sector, we can establish 
that state ownership –as we have seen studying the stat ’s asset structure- was 
characteristic of Hungary in 1989 as most corporatins were owned by the state. In 
the past 18 years the ratio of state-ownership has lowered from 85% to 7 %. Private 
ownership rate reached 20% by 2007, while the percentag  of foreign ownership has 
increased even more spectacularly. Foreign ownership rate reached 25% by the 
middle of 1990’s and doubled by 2007. Property value of foreign investments 
increased from 39 billion forints (in 1989) to 15.200 billion forints. Nowadays, 
foreign investors own fifty percent of Hungarian enterprises. 
 
The ratio of capital inflow and outflow is what counts. If national investors 
have at least as much invested capital abroad as the inflow of foreign capital –no 
problem should arise. At least, if their yields transferred back and forth are – by and 
large –balanced. In this case only the advantages of the division of labour are 
experienced and all parties make a profit. When the flow of capital is one-sided and 
economic development is based on external resources, a fundamental difference 
between the GDP and the GNI should be expected.  
In an OECD report (OECD 2004) one can find significant and relevant data 
concerning the issues above. There is no significant difference between GDP and 
GNI in most of the OECD countries , there were no major differences between the 
development of the two indexes, except in the cases of two or three countries – 
including Hungary. 
In Hungary the outflow of incomes was far higher than inflow; thus GNI 
remained much lower than GDP. This indicates indirectly that the ratio of foreign-
owned corporations, the profit of which is mostly repatriated, is significantly high.  
The welfare of a country's population depends on the income remaining inside 
the country. National consumption is (or might be) increased in the long run, if 
national income is spent or invested at home. Incomes transferred abroad work the 
same way – only in a foreign country. IF an FDI, it creates in the other country 
incomes in form of wages. Besides these issues, the dynamics of GDP and GNI are 
also strongly influenced by the t rms of trade. Unfavourable terms of trade mean 
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that through the exchange of home made goods for imported goods income is drawn 
out of the country. According to certain calculations (see Botos J., 2009), the 
decrease in the terms of trade in the last ten years we e almost as much as the GDP 
of a base year. Because of the price formations of external trade, that amount, one 
base year’s GDP, flowed out of the country in 7 years. This could happen since one 
or two years of improvement was counterweighted by the deterioration of these 
terms in the remaining years. Analysts may come to think that the explanation lies in 
foreign-owned corporations. These corporations may influence the income 
remaining in the country by means of import, which in many cases comes from their 
subsidiaries... The formulation of transfer prices an be especially interesting from 
the point of view of taxation – besides, it can also influence GNI indexes. Keeping 
the setting of prices under control is a complicated task, the importance of which, in 
our view, has so far been overlooked by Hungarian economic leaders. 
 
6.  Summary 
 
After the fall of communism financial accounts of market participants changed 
profoundly. On the one hand, the ratio of business share assets increased in the 
housholds' portfolio; on the other hand, it has decreased to the minimum in the state 
portfolio. The winners of all this are foreign investors– who became the owner of a 
significant proportion of Hungarian national wealth. Both the 'inherited' and the 
continuously 'produced' public finance deficit - financed from external resources- 
played a part in the above process. We had to sell out our wealth for foreign owner 
to finance our debts. 
Economic policy after the fall of communism was mainly based on export-led 
development. We can  conclude that such an economic policy, which was guided by 
external markets, is a cause and an effect at the sam  time – and did not serve social 
welfare in Hungary properly in the past decades. It is an effect of the significant 
outstanding total debt inherited from the socialist controlled economy, which made 
the economy become export-directed for the sake of foreign currency acquisition. It 
is also a cause because it invited too much foreign capital into Hungary as FDI-s. 
These foreign investments took the majority of their profit out of the country, 
blocking the way in certain sense for both present and future welfare development. It 
seems that Hungarian standards of living have littl chance of reaching the Western 
European level in the near future. 
We seem to have manoeuvred ourselves into an economic policy that proves 
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